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 This essay concerns a very current and unanticipated constitutional development 
from March 17, 2008.  On that date, the Supreme Court surprised constitutional law 
experts when it decided to review the government’s power to ban so-called “indecent” 
expression in the broadcast media1 for the first time since the Court’s only prior 
ruling on point: its 1978 decision in the case of Federal Communications Commission 
v. Pacifica.2
 It was surprising that the Court granted the certiorari petition in this case, which 
is called Fox Television Stations v. Federal Communications Commission, since the 
ruling at issue, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, was based on a 
narrow issue of administrative law.3  Specifically, the Second Circuit held that the 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) had not provided a sufficient 
explanation for its dramatic new crackdown on broadcast “indecency”4 in the wake of 
the infamous “wardrobe malfunction” at the televised 2004 Super Bowl game, which 
one commentator called “a tempest in a C-cup!”5
 If you have not been following these new broadcast censorship measures closely, 
I do not think you could imagine how extreme they are.  The FCC has been imposing 
record-breaking fines on broadcasters even for the f leeting, spontaneous use of a 
single four-letter word in a clearly non-sexual context.6  For example, the FCC 
condemned a documentary film about blues musicians, which was made by Martin 
Scorsese and broadcasted by an educational television station, because some of the 
artists being interviewed uttered what the FCC discreetly calls the “f-word” or the 
“s-word.”7  The FCC even ruled that the news program, The Early Show, had 
committed “indecency” because during a live interview, a guest used the word 
“bullshitter”; the FCC stressed that its censorship rules contain “no exemption [for 
news].”8
 The FCC’s new zero tolerance approach is so extreme that it even has been 
condemned by some former officials of the FCC itself; officials who had supported 
1. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008); 
see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Take Up On-Air Vulgarity Again, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2008, at A16.
2. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
3. See 489 F.3d 444.
4. Id. at 462.
5. Liz Langley, Consider Context: Out-of-Place and You’re Out of Line, Orlando Sentinel, Apr. 27, 2007, 
at 6.  See generally CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008) (vacating the FCC’s orders imposing 
a monetary forfeiture under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) for the broadcast of “indecent” material in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1464 and 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999, and remanding for further proceedings consistent with the 
opinion).  Although the CBS decision involved other aspects of the FCC’s regime governing broadcast 
“indecency” than those at issue in the Fox case, and although both circuit court rulings were based on 
non-constitutional grounds, ultimately both cases involve the same fundamental First Amendment 
principles, which this essay addresses.
6. See In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe 
Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004) (memorandum opinion and order).
7. John Eggerton, FCC ‘Whitewashing’ Blues, Says Scorsese, Broadcasting & Cable, May 8, 2006, http://
www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6332444.html?display=Breaking+News.
8. Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 454, 458, 463 (2d Cir. 2007), cert granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3496 (Mar. 
17, 2008) (No. 07-582).
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prior FCC limits on broadcast indecency.  Yet, even they felt impelled to denounce 
the recent repression as “a radical . . . censorship crusade that will . . . chill . . . all but 
the blandest . . . program fare.”9
 In the Fox case that the Supreme Court just agreed to review, Fox and the other 
broadcast networks had also challenged the FCC’s sweeping new restrictions on 
statutory and First Amendment grounds, but the Second Circuit did not need to 
resolve those issues because it struck down the new rules on narrower administrative 
law grounds.  That said, the Second Circuit’s opinion did include a section, explicitly 
labeled “dicta,” that noted the substantial First Amendment problems with the FCC’s 
ramped-up restrictions.10  But the Supreme Court rarely reaches issues that the lower 
courts have not addressed fully on the merits.11   
 Nonetheless, the U.S. Solicitor General, on behalf of the FCC, strongly urged 
the High Court to hear the Fox case, stressing its extremely important constitutional 
implications.12  The Solicitor General argued to the Supreme Court that the Second 
Circuit’s ruling “strikes at the heart of ” the entire “broadcast indecency regulatory 
framework.”13  He argued that the Second Circuit’s decision “effectively nullifies” 
the federal statute that bars “indecent” expression over the airwaves and that it defies 
the Supreme Court’s 1978 Pacifica ruling, which had upheld that statute.14
 In short, the U.S. government invited the Supreme Court to re-examine not only 
the specific FCC rules at issue in the Fox case itself, but also the broad fundamental 
underlying First Amendment questions about whether the broadcast media should 
continue to be relegated to second-class status under the First Amendment.  The 
Court could thus use this case for a long overdue re-examination of whether it should 
continue to enforce Pacifica’s ban on “indecent” expression from broadcasting, even 
though, post-Pacifica, the Court has held that such expression is constitutionally 
protected in every other medium.15
 I will briefly outline the core First Amendment problems that mar not only the 
FCC’s new crackdown on broadcast “indecency,” but also any restriction on any 
sexually-oriented expression in any medium.  I want to stress the insoluble First 
Amendment problems with any censorial regime in this area, no matter what adjective 
is used for the targeted expression—for example, “indecent,” “offensive,” “obscene,” 
or “pornographic.”
9. Brief of Former FCC Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners and in Support of a Declaration 
That Indecency Enforcement Violates the First Amendment at 1, Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d 444 
(No. 06-5358). 
10. Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 462 n.12.
11. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1308 (1973).
12. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fox Television Stations, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (No. 07-582).
13. Id. at 28.
14. Id. at 29.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (cable television); Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (Internet); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 
U.S. 727 (1996) (cable television); Sable Commc’ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (dial-a-porn).
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 These First Amendment problems arise no matter how the stigmatizing term is 
defined and no matter what the government’s goal is—for example, protecting 
children or women or so-called “traditional family values.”  The inevitable First 
Amendment f law with any such regulatory regime flows from the fact that, in our 
wonderfully diverse society, we all have widely divergent ideas, values, and tastes, 
especially about what sexual expression we find positive or negative for ourselves and 
our own children.  Therefore, we cannot responsibly delegate these inherently 
personal choices to anyone else, including government officials or our fellow 
citizens.
 Let me describe a cartoon that well captures this reality: it shows three people in 
an art museum looking at a classic nude female torso, a fragment of an ancient 
sculpture minus limbs.  Each viewer’s reaction is shown in an air bubble.  The first 
one thinks, “Art!”; the second thinks, “Smut!”; and the third thinks, “An insult to 
amputees!”
 In such an inescapably subjective, value-laden area, it is inherently impossible to 
come up with clear guidelines.  For example, for the past half-century, the Supreme 
Court has tried but failed to come up with objective standards for defining 
constitutionally unprotected obscenity.16  The most famous line in the Court’s many 
unsuccessful efforts came from former Justice Potter Stewart, when he candidly 
admitted:  I cannot define it, “[b]ut I know it when I see it.”17  The problem, though, 
is that every judge, along with everyone else, sees a different “it”!
 That fact was well-stated by another highly respected former Justice, John 
Marshall Harlan, a distinguished graduate of our own law school (class of 1924).18 
As Justice Harlan put it, “One [person’s] vulgarity is another’s lyric.”19  We individuals 
even have different perspectives about whether any given expression has any sexual 
content at all.  This is captured by the old joke about the man who sees every inkblot 
his psychiatrist shows him as wildly erotic.  When his psychiatrist says to him, 
“You’re obsessed with sex,” the man answers: “What do you mean I’m obsessed? 
You’re the one who keeps showing me all these dirty pictures.”!!!  
 The problem with such irreducibly vague concepts is that enforcing officials will 
necessarily exercise their unfettered discretion according to their own subjective 
tastes, or those of politically powerful community members.  In consequence, the 
enforcement patterns will be arbitrary at best, discriminatory at worst.  At best, 
which particular expression will be deemed off limits will be completely unpredictable. 
This causes what courts call a “chilling effect” because when no one wants to run the 
risk of criminal prosecution, people may well self-censor, not engaging in expression 
16. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies § 11.3.4.2 (3d  ed. 
2006).
17. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
18. James F. Simon, Foreword: The New York Law School Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice John 
Marshall Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
19. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
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that might be deemed unacceptable by the powers that be.20  That self-censorship 
not only violates the free speech rights of all those who were deterred from speaking; 
it also deprives all the rest of us of the chance to hear valued expression, including 
constitutionally protected speech.21 
 To illustrate this inherent problem, I would like to cite some of the FCC’s recent 
rulings enforcing its new zero-tolerance policy, which is the direct focus of the Fox 
case.
 Again, the FCC maintains that it may punish even a single, spontaneous use of a 
four-letter word, even when it has no sexual connotation, and even if it is part of a 
program with serious value.22  However, the FCC has stressed that it will not always 
punish such a word, since it has to exercise its discretion to take into account the 
entire context in which the suspect word was uttered.23
 This compounds the First Amendment problems, by leading to arbitrary, 
unpredictable results.  Let me cite some examples of recent FCC rulings enforcing 
these new policies, which were all included in a single recent order.24  The FCC held 
that “bullshit” was indecent, but that “dick” and “dickhead” were not indecent.  It 
held that “fuck ’em” was indecent, but that “up yours” and “kiss my ass” were not 
indecent.  It held that non-explicit suggestions of teenagers’ sexual activity in general 
were indecent, but that explicit discussions of specific teen sexual practices were not 
indecent.25  As I noted earlier, the FCC held that blues musicians’ uses of “fuck” and 
“shit” in Martin Scorsese’s documentary film were indecent, but it held that actors’ 
uses of the very same words in the fictional film Saving Private Ryan were not.26  
 In response to these inevitably erratic rulings, no wonder we have seen so much 
self-censorship in broadcasting lately.  For example, before the FCC issued the order 
that decreed Saving Private Ryan was not subject to its “f leeting expletive” ban, many 
television stations had cancelled their planned airing of Saving Private Ryan on 
20. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 
419 U.S. 1314, 1318 (1974). 
21. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656; Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Playboy Entm’t 
Group, 529 U.S. 803; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844; Denver Area Educ. Telecomm., 518 U.S. 727; Sable, 
492 U.S. 115.
22. In re Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975.
23. In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broad. Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, 
21 F.C.C.R 2664 (2006) (notices of apparent liability and memorandum opinion and order).
24. In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broad. Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, 
21 F.C.C.R. 13,299 (2006) (order).
25. See Brief in Opposition of NBC Universal, Inc. and NBC Telemundo License Co. at 9, Fox Television 
Stations, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (No. 07-582) (bullshit was initially found to be indecent but was later 
overturned); Frank Ahrens, FCC Dismisses 36 Indecency Complaints As Not ‘Patently Offensive,’ Wash. 
Post, Jan. 25, 2005, at E01; FCC Says Swearing on TV Is OK—Sometimes, Associated Press, Nov. 7, 
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15607715/.
26. Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 463.
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Veteran’s Day because they reasonably feared that the FCC would find it indecent.27 
Likewise, a PBS station cancelled a historical documentary about Marie Antoinette 
because it contained sexually suggestive drawings.28  Given the government’s zero 
tolerance approach toward any use of any of the taboo words, a Vermont public radio 
station even barred a state senate candidate from a political debate.  The station 
manager feared that the candidate might do on air what he had done during a 
previous live debate; he had lost his temper and called two audience members 
“shits.”29  
 I will cite just a couple more examples of the rampant self-censorship that is, 
sadly, a rational response to the FCC’s arbitrary, subjective rulings.  I have chosen 
two that should be of special significance to all those with close ties to New York 
City.  One arose on October 3, 2007, which marked the fiftieth anniversary of the 
landmark court decision that found poet and publisher Lawrence Ferlinghetti not 
guilty of obscenity for publishing Alan Ginsberg’s famous poem, “Howl.”30  The 
Pacifica Radio station in New York City, WBAI, had been planning to commemorate 
the golden anniversary of this historic case—in which the ACLU represented 
Ferlinghetti, I am proud to say—by broadcasting a recording of Ginsberg reading the 
poem.31  Ironically though, WBAI was forced to cancel these plans.  Given the 
FCC’s draconian new fines of $325,000 for each taboo word, “Howl” contains more 
than enough such words to obliterate WBAI’s $4 million budget.32  
 The final example I will cite to illustrate the deep chill that the FCC has caused 
should especially resonate with those close to Ground Zero.  CBS affiliates pulled a 
documentary about the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which showed actual footage of shocked 
onlookers watching the Twin Towers crash down.  Not surprisingly, many of them 
were exclaiming in horror, but the documentary was pulled because some of the 
horrified exclamations included four-letter words.33
 I do not mean to single out the FCC unfairly.  To the contrary, my point is that 
these kinds of arbitrary rulings will necessarily be issued by any government officials 
enforcing any restriction on any sexual expression, given the inevitable vagueness of 
any regulations in this inherently subjective area.
27. Ann Oldenburg, Some Stations Shelved ‘Private Ryan’ Amid FCC Fears, USA Today, Nov. 11, 2004, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/television/news/2004-11-11-private-ryan_x.htm.
28. Colin Mahan, PBS Beheads Marie Antoinette, TV.com, Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.tv.com/story/6484.
html.
29. Philip Baruth, VT Senate Debate Turns, Well, Batshit-Crazy, Vt. Daily Briefing, Oct. 18, 2006, http://
www.vermontdailybriefing.com/?m=200610&paged=2.
30. See Patricia Cohen, Howl in an Era That Fears Indecency, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2007, at E3; see also People 
v. Ferlinghetti (1957), as reprinted in Allen Ginsburg, Howl 173–74 (Barry Miles ed., Harper & Row, 
Publishers 1986) (1956).
31. Cohen, supra note 30. 
32. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU ‘Howls’ Against FCC Destroying the Best Poems of a 
Generation (Oct. 3, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/freespeech/censorship/32060prs20071003.html.
33. See Larry Neumeister, Some CBS Affiliates Worry Over 9/11 Doc, Associated Press, Sept. 3, 2006, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/03/ap/entertainment/mainD8JTJSE80.shtml.
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 The unguided discretion that is required to enforce such vague concepts as 
“offensive” or “indecent” or “obscene” is also likely to be exercised in a discriminatory 
fashion, singling out expression that is produced by, or appeals to, individuals or 
groups who are relatively unpopular or powerless.  Indeed, recent obscenity 
prosecutions have targeted expression of lesbian and gay sexuality, as well as rap 
music by young African-American men.34  Likewise, the FCC’s crackdowns on 
broadcast indecency have disproportionately singled out non-mainstream, counter-
cultural expression.  One recent example is the song “Your Revolution” by feminist 
rap artist Sarah Jones.35 
 I would like to conclude on an upbeat note by quoting one of my favorite 
philosophers, Woody Allen.  He was once coming to the end of a speech, and he told 
his audience: “I’d like to end with something positive, but I can’t think of anything 
positive to say.  Would you settle for two negatives?!”  Well, I actually have two 
major positives! 
 First, in a line of recent cases, the Supreme Court consistently has struck down 
restrictions on sexual expression in all new media, despite the government’s arguments 
that these media should be relegated to the same second-class status as broadcast.36 
In these recent cases, the Court has rejected the very same rationale that it had 
accepted for broadcast restrictions back in the 1978 Pacifica case, to shield children 
from certain sexual expression.37  Rather, in these recent cases, the Court consistently 
has held that the goal of shielding children from such expression does not justify 
depriving adults of access to it.38  Although the Court has not yet directly reconsidered 
or overturned Pacifica itself, in every subsequent case, the Court has read that 
precedent very narrowly.39  Accordingly, the Court has rejected restrictions on sexual 
expression on telephones (in the context of “Dial-A-Porn”),40 cable television,41 and 
34. See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Stopping the Obscenity Madness 50 Years After Roth v. United 
States, 9 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 1, 2–3, 18 (2007).
35. Dan Odenwald, Commissioners Seek Crackdown on Indecency, Current, July 16, 2001, http://www.
current.org/radio/radio0113indecency.html. 
36. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (Internet); Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (virtual child 
pornography); Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803 (cable television); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 
(Internet).
37. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
38. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 252 (virtual child pornography); Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. at 819 
(cable television); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 846 (internet); Sable, 492 U.S. at 126–27 (dial-a-porn). 
39. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 870; Sable, 492 U.S. at 127 (representing cases in which Pacifica was 
considered an “emphatically narrow” holding).
40. Sable, 492 U.S. 115. 
41. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803.
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on the Internet.42  These recent decisions have been joined by Justices from across 
the ideological spectrum, including even John Paul Stevens, the author of Pacifica.43 
 The second major positive development is the Supreme Court’s historic 2003 
decision in Lawrence v. Texas.44  Not only did the Court strike down the statute at 
issue, Texas’s discriminatory ban on same-gender sodomy, but the Court based its 
holding on broad-ranging rationales, which should sound the death-knell for all laws 
that restrict other personal and private conduct by consenting adults, including their 
consumption of sexual expression.45  Most importantly, the Court expressly held that 
laws cannot constitutionally be based only on majoritarian views about morality.46 
This holding provoked a fierce tirade in Justice Scalia’s strident dissent.  He rightly 
recognized that this holding should doom a whole host of laws far beyond the 
discriminatory anti-sodomy laws that were at issue in Lawrence itself.  Justice Scalia’s 
list of “endangered laws” expressly includes anti-obscenity laws.47  While this 
sweeping potential was the cause of Justice Scalia’s consternation, for civil libertarians 
it is cause for celebration.  As he wrote:
State laws [that are only based on moral choices include laws] against bigamy, 
same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, 
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of 
Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices.  Every single one of these 
laws is called into question by today’s decision.48
 The 1973 decision Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, upholding the obscenity 
exception, ruled that this exception was justified to preserve the “moral tone” of the 
community.49  Therefore, Justice Scalia was absolutely right in his Lawrence dissent 
when he said that the majority’s rationale would warrant overturning the obscenity 
exception.  In fact, one lower court ruling has held precisely that, Lawrence does spell 
the death-knell for anti-obscenity laws.50  In that important ruling, federal judge 
Gary Lancaster, in following Lawrence, wrote: “[O]bscenity statutes [unconstitutionally] 
burden an individual’s fundamental right to possess, read, observe, and think about 
what [they] choose in the privacy of [their] own home.”51  While an appellate court 
42. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844. 
43. Justice Stevens joined all the cited opinions.  Furthermore, he wrote the majority opinion in Reno v. 
ACLU.  Id. at 848.  In Sable, he joined Justice Brennan’s concurrence to parts I, II, and IV and dissent 
to part III of the Court’s opinion.  Sable, 492 U.S. at 116.
44. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
45. See id. at 564–606. 
46. Id. at 577–78; id. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. 413 U.S. 49, 68–69 (1973).  In holding that “obscene material has no protection under the First 
Amendment,” the Court recognized the broad powers of states to protect the public environment.  Id.
50. U.S. v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 590–91 (W.D. Pa. 2005).
51. Id. at 595–96. 
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overturned that ruling, it did not do so because it disagreed with Judge Lancaster’s 
reading of Lawrence.  Rather, the appellate court concluded that only the Supreme 
Court itself should directly apply its Lawrence holding to the obscenity context.52  I 
am cautiously optimistic that, before long, the Supreme Court will do just that.
 I will conclude with a passage from one of the most important First Amendment 
opinions ever written, not only on the specific subject I have been addressing, but 
also in general.  That opinion, written by New York Law School alumnus Justice 
John Marshall Harlan, was in the case of Cohen v. California in 1971.53  Since Cohen 
upheld free speech specifically for the “f-word,” it should weigh heavily against the 
FCC’s new zero tolerance approach toward that very word.  We should follow Justice 
Harlan’s enlightened approach in Cohen for all expression in all media, including 
broadcast.  The Cohen case arose during the Vietnam War, and the Court upheld the 
right of a young man, Paul Cohen, to wear, inside a courthouse, a jacket on which he 
had written a message that was very offensive to many people, not only because it 
contained the “f-word,” but also because of its larger point.  Specifically, Paul Cohen’s 
jacket proclaimed: “Fuck the draft.”54
 Notably, Justice Harlan was a conservative Republican who had been appointed 
by a Republican president.  Many conservatives want to limit government’s power 
over our private lives, leaving up to us decisions about what we say, what we see, and 
what our own young children see, instead of letting the government dictate these 
matters to us.  Justice Harlan eloquently explains why denying government such 
censorial power is essential not only for individual liberty, but also for our democratic 
society.  So I will let him have the last word.  As he wrote:  
[The right of free expression] is designed and intended to remove governmental 
restraints from . . . public discussion, putting the decision as to what views 
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that . . . such 
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect 
polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the . . . 
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.55
52. U.S. v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2005).
53. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
54. Id. at 16.
55. Id. at 24.
